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Abstract
We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the
likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert riskprevention e¤ort to mitigate the
consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, condence improves. This attracts
managers to the innovative sector. But, when condence becomes high, less managers exerting low
riskprevention e¤ort also enter. This accelerates the growth of the industry, while inducing a decline
in riskprevention. The longer the boom, the stronger the condence, the larger the losses if a shock
occurs. While the above dynamics arise in the rst best, with asymmetric information there is excessive
entry of ine¢ cient managers, earning informational rents at the expense of e¢ cient managers. This
inates the innovative sector and increases its vulnerability.
2
1 Introduction
As vividly illustrated by the boom and bust of the nancial sector in the recent decade, innovations
can spur rapid growth as well as declining standards, accumulated risk, and nally crises. The goal of
this paper is to shed light on the dynamics of innovations and risk. Innovations, by their very nature,
are initially untested. Market participants are initially uncertain about the strength, potential and
workings of an innovation.4 They progressively learn about it. Innovative resecuritization techniques
o¤er a good illustration of initial uncertainty and the scope for learning. CDOs of ABSs o¤ered
new ways to reallocate risk, potentially enhancing risk sharing and liquidity. But the reliability and
e¤ectiveness of this innovation was not fully clear exante. It depended, in particular, on the degree of
correlation between the property markets in di¤erent American cities, a parameter about which there
was uncertainty. Awareness of uncertainty about the strength of nancial innovations was displayed
in a School Briefpublished in The Economist, in 1999,
Some of the new nancial technologies are, in e¤ect, e¤orts to bottle up considerable
uncertainties. If they work, the world economy will be more stable. If not, an economic
disaster might ensue.Quoted in The Economist, September 7th, 2013, page 57
Motivated by these stylized facts, we study uncertainty and learning about the fragility of an
innovative industry, i.e., the likelihood that it is hit by negative shock. More precisely, we assume
that, with some probability the innovation is strong, while with the complementary probability it is
weak. When the innovation is weak, there is a signicant risk of negative aggregate shocks, reducing
4We focus on Bayesian uncertainty, where agents learn about parameters. This di¤ers from Knightian uncertainty,
studied, e.g., by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008).
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the productivity of all projects in the innovative sector. When the innovation is strong, the likelihood
of such negative shocks is lower. As long as there is no aggregate shock, condence in the strength of
the innovation increases. This leads to an increase in the size of the innovative sector. In contrast,
when negative shocks occur, this generates pessimism and leads to a decline in the size of the innovative
sector.5
Our model features managers and investors. The latter can invest directly, using standard and
well known vehicles. Alternatively, they can delegate the care of their investments to managers in the
innovative sector. Unlike investors, managers have the skills necessary to operate in the innovative
sector. Also, when selecting investments in that sector, they can exert costly riskprevention e¤ort,
to reduce downward risk. This is in line with investment situations with bounded upside in which the
key is to prevent an unusually low downside. This applies, in general, to the need for due diligence
in the purchase of assets, whereby failure to inspect an asset may fail to uncover some hidden aw.
This ts particularly well the purchase of xed income securities. For example, when investing in
a portfolio of CDOs, or high yield bonds, the manager can carefully scrutinize the quality of the
paper he invests in. Alternatively, if not exerting riskprevention e¤ort, the manager relies on ready
made evaluations, such as those obtained from credit rating agencies. We consider a continuum
of heterogeneous managers. Some have e¢ cient riskmanagement systems, so that, for them, risk
prevention e¤ort is not very costly. Others have less e¢ cient riskmanagement systems and incur
larger costs when they exert riskprevention e¤ort.
5Thus our analysis is in line with Zeira (1987, 1999), Rob (1991), Pastor and Veronesi (2006), and Barbarino and
Jovanovic (2007), who show that learning induces uctuations in industry size.
4
Our key assumption is that the benets of riskprevention e¤ort materialize when the innovation is
subsequently hit by a negative shock. When there is no negative shock, innovative projects fare well,
even when managers exerted low e¤ort. When a negative shock hits, the projects whose managers
exerted high riskprevention e¤ort are relatively robust, while the other projects are highly likely to
fail. This assumption ts the stylized facts from the Tech boom and bust. Market participants who
invested undiscriminately in dot.com ventures fared relatively well until the bust of March 2000, but
then incurred large losses. Another example is momentumlike trading, where, instead of conducting
fundamental analysis, fund managers invest in stocks that previously fared well. While such strategy
can generate prots in lenient market environments, it runs the risk of large losses when the market
is hit by a negative shock.6 Similarly, institutions which purchased mortgage backed securities based
on supercial risk controls and readymade evaluations such as ratings, made large losses only when
the crisis hit, in the summer of 2007. In contrast, those professional investors and investment banks
who scrutinized quality lost much less.
For clarity and simplicity, we rst analyze the case where e¤ort is observable and contractible. Then
we turn to the moral hazard case. With symmetric information, we obtain the following equilibrium
dynamics. Initially, when condence is low, only managers with e¢ cient riskmanagement systems
enter, and they exert high riskprevention e¤ort. At some point, condence becomes so high that entry
becomes protable for managers with less e¢ cient riskprevention systems, exerting low e¤ort. This
accelerates the growth of the innovative sector, while inducing a decline in risk prevention standards.
Thus, our theoretical analysis yields the following implications:
6Daniel and Moskowitz (2012) nd that momentum strategies earn negative returns when markets are particularly
volatile and declining. Similarly, Daniel, Jagannathan and Kim (2012) nd that momentum strategies experience infre-
quent but severe losses, when the market is turbulent.
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 After strong cumulated performance there is an endogenous decline in riskprevention standards,
with the strongest decline occuring precisely at the time of the sharpest increase in the size of
the innovative sector.
 As condence increases, there is both a decline in the probability of a negative shock and an
increase in the size of the aggregate loss in case of shock. This is consistent with the empirical
ndings of DellAriccia et al (2012) that busts following long booms are worse than those coming
after short booms.
 When riskprevention standards start declining, there is an increase in the crosssectional vari-
ance of the probability of default across managers. If the growth of the innovative sector continues
long enough, however, the variance of default probabilities across managers eventually declines.
 When the return on standard investments is low and investors search for yield, the growth of
the innovative sector is stronger, but the size of total losses in case of shock is larger.
 As managers are heterogeneous with respect to the cost of e¤ort, while the marginal manager is
indi¤erent between the two sectors, inframarginal managers in the innovative sector earn quasi
rents, consistent with the ndings of Philippon and Reshe¤ (2009). Furthermore, our theory
implies that the wage di¤erential between the two sectors should increase with the cumulated
performance of the innovative sector.
While the above dynamics arise under symmetric information, in practice innovative industries
are likely to be plagued with incentive problems and information asymmetries. The techniques used
by managers in the innovative sector are new and di¢ cult to understand for outside investors. The
corresponding opacity makes it di¢ cult for the investors to observe, monitor and control the actions
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of the managers. Therefore, to increase the relevance of our analysis, we extend it to the case where
information is asymmetric, as managerse¤orts and costs are unobservable by investors. In this richer
setting, which we refer to as moral hazard, we obtain the following additional implications:
 Moral hazard reduces the ability to ensure that managers exert high riskprevention e¤ort.
At the same time, when condence is low, it is not protable to invest in the innovation if the
manager is to exert low riskprevention e¤ort. Thus, when initial condence is low and incentive
problems are severe, there is no investment in the innovative sector. In a sense the innovation is
trapped.7
 On the other hand, if condence is somewhat larger, the innovation grows faster and the in-
novative sector is larger with incentive problems than without. In the rstbest, initially, only
managers with e¢ cient riskprevention systems enter, and they exert high e¤ort. In contrast,
under moral hazard, it is di¢ cult to screen e¢ cient managers exerting high e¤ort from less ef-
cient managers exerting low e¤ort. This facilitates the entry of ine¢ cient managers, exerting
low riskprevention e¤ort. Such entry fuels the growth of the innovative sector, and inates its
size relative to the rst best.
 In this context, the expected compensation of managers exerting low e¤ort exceeds their pro-
ductivity. They earn informational rents, at the expenses of the e¢ cient managers exerting high
e¤ort.
7 In our analysis, as in the cascade model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) or the multiplayer bandit of
Bolton and Harris (1999), agents dont internalize the positive externalities their own experimentation creates for others.
But what precludes optimal experimentation in the present model is moral hazard, which di¤ers from Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) or Bolton and Harris (1999).
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 This situation is benecial for the ine¢ cient managers who would not have been hired in the
rst best, but it is socially costly, as it increases the vulnerability of the innovative sector and
the aggregate loss in case of shock.
While our theoretical model could also be applied to nonnancial innovations, it is particularly
appropriate to describe and analyze the dynamics of innovations in the nance sector. Three of the
most important features of nancial innovations play a key role in our analysis: First, riskcontrol
and management are key to the success of nancial innovations, and it is precisely these activities
which the managers of our model are in charge of. Second, the complexity and nonphysical nature of
nancial innovations make it di¢ cult for outside investor to observe nance sector managers actions,
which generates moral hazard, as in our model. Third, when nancial innovations prove to be weak,
this generates severe losses for a large crosssection of nancial institutions, again as in our model.
Our theoretical analysis shows that, with imperfect markets, the equilibrium size of the nancial
sector can exceed its rst best counterpart, as in Bolton et al (2013) and Atkeson et al (2013). Yet,
our analysis and theirs involve markedly di¤erent economic mechanisms. In our paper it is the entry
of managers exerting lowrisk prevention e¤ort that inates the nancial sector, while in Bolton et al
(2013) it is the fact that dealers entry in the opaque OTC market worsens adverse selection in the
transparent market, and in Atkeson et al (2013) entry is excessive because of congestion externalities.
Our model involves learning, as in Diamond (1991), Noe and Rebello (2012), Persons and Warther
(1997) and Berk and Green (2004). Again, our analysis involves very di¤erent economic mechanisms,
and generates qualitatively di¤erent results. In particular, Diamond (1991)s result that agents are less
likely to be of the risky type after good performance contrasts with our result that riskprevention
standards decline after good performance. Similarly, while in Noe and Rebello (2012) the incentives
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of the agent improve as the rm is perceived to be less vulnerable, in our model it is the opposite.
Also, while in Persons and Warther (1997) there is positive skewness in the distribution of outcomes
across innovations, so that most innovations perform worse than expected, in our analysis, there is
negative skewness: after good performance, managers switch to low riskprevention, creating the risk
of unlikely but large aggregate losses. Finally, in Berk and Green (2004), learning about the skills of
an individual manager drives the amount of funds this manager is entrusted with. In contrast, we
model learning about the industry, driving the aggregate amount of funds delegated to managers. In
this context, unlike in Berk and Green (2004), aggregate industry risk varies reecting i) the likelihood
that the industry is strong and ii) the aggregate level of riskprevention e¤ort.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 examines the case where e¤ort is observable.
Section 4 turns to the moral hazard case. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Agents and goods
Consider an innite horizon economy, operating in discrete time at periods t = 1; 2; ::. At each
period, there is a massone continuum of competitive managers, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and a massone
continuum of investors. All are risk neutral and have limited liability. In the basic version of our
model, with symmetric information, equilibrium is the same irrespective of whether agents live one
period or many. When we turn to the moral hazard case (in Section 4), to simplify the contracting
problem, we assume market participants live only one period and, at the beginning of each period, a
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new generation is born.8
At the beginning of each period, each investor is endowed with one unit of investment good,
while managers have no initial endowment. Investors can invest their initial endowment themselves,
an option we hereafter refer to as selfinvestment.The rate of return on selfinvestment is denoted
by r, i.e., 1 unit of investment good yields 1 + r units of consumption good. Alternatively, each
investor can decide to delegate the management of her investment good to a manager operating in the
innovative sector. Each manager can handle only one unit of investment this is the simplest way to
model decreasing returns to scale, in the same spirit as Berk and Green (2004). Managers that are
not in charge of investments remain in their initial occupation, with opportunity wage normalized to
0. At the end of each period, all market participants consume their share of the consumption good.
2.2 Uncertainty and learning
When a new technology is discovered, its quality is initially untested. Before agents have been able
to experiment with it, they are uncertain how it will fare in various circumstances. Correspondingly,
agents must learn about the strengths and weaknesses of the innovation. We consider the case where
the innovation can be weak or strong and model learning as follows.
Each period, the innovative sector can fare well, which is denoted by  = 0. Alternatively it can
be hit by a negative aggregate shock (denoted by  = 1), reducing the expected productivity of all
innovative projects.9 Initially the likelihood of shocks is uncertain, but all market participants know
8Dynamic contracting under moral hazard and learning can generate rich but complex phenomena. In particular,
unobserved shirking can create a wedge between the beliefs of principals and agents. Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005)
and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) o¤er insightful analyses of this problem.
9Hereafter, for brevity, we sometimes omit the qualier negative, but when we simply write shockwe always refer
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that the innovation can be strong or weak and that strong innovations are less prone to negative
shocks than fragile ones. More precisely, when the innovation is strong, the probability of a negative
shock is 1  p. When it is fragile this probability is 1  p > 1  p.
Throughout the paper we assume the occurrence of shocks is observable and contractible. Hence,
market participants use past realizations to conduct Bayesian learning about the strength of the
innovation. At the beginning of the rst period (t = 1), they start with the prior probability 1 that
the innovation is strong. For t > 1, denote by t the updated probability that the innovation is strong,
given the returns realized in the innovative sector at times f1; :::; t  1g. When there is no shock, the
probability that the innovation is strong is revised upward to:
pt
pt + p(1  t) > t: (1)
If there is a negative shock, the probability that the innovation is strong is revised downward to
(1  p)t
(1  p)t + (1  p)(1  t) < t:
Thus, p > p is a key assumption in our model. It implies that weak innovations are more exposed to
negative shocks than strong ones, and consequently that when shocks are rare the innovation is likely
to be strong. At each point in time t, the problem faced by all market participants is the same as at
t   1, except for the di¤erence in the probability that the innovation is strong. The dynamics of the
probability (t) that the innovation is strong is one to one with that of the updated probability of a
negative shock
t = 1  (tp+ (1  t)p): (2)
We hereafter use t as the state variable. When, the innovation is known for sure to be weak, i.e.,
to a negative shock.
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t = 0, then t = 1   p. When, the innovation is known for sure to be strong, i.e., t = 1, then
t = 1  p.
2.3 E¤ort, output and costs
Each agent i can exert high e¤ort (ei = e) or low e¤ort (ei = e). For simplicity, we normalize e to
1. If there is no shock, for all projects the realization of the output variable ~Y is Y > 1 + r with
probability 1, irrespective of e¤ort. If there is a negative shock, with probability  + (1   ei) 1 e a
project fails and the realization of ~Y is 0. With the complementary probability the project is successful
and the realization of ~Y is Y . High managerial e¤ort leads to an improvement in the distribution of
output in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance. We interpret this in terms of riskprevention.
For example, in a nancial context, fund managers and bankers can spend e¤ort and resources on
riskanalysis. Such high e¤ort enables them to screen investment opportunities and avoid those with
a large failure risk. In contrast, ei = e corresponds to weak riskmanagement practices such as, e.g,
exclusive reliance on external credit rating agencies, backwardlooking measures of risk or failure to
conduct adequate stresstests as discussed in Ellul and Yerramilli (2010). Such lack of fundamental
valuation and risk analysis exposes investments to larger downside risk in case of negative shocks.
While managers all have access to the same type of investment project, they are heterogeneous
with respect to the e¢ ciency of their risk management systems. When exerting e¤ort ei, manager i
incurs nonmonetary cost eiCi. Ci is distributed over [C; C] with cdf F . Managers with high Cs have
ine¢ cient riskcontrol systems, making it di¢ cult and costly for them to screen out bad investment
projects.
It is very di¢ cult for outside investors to observe and monitor the e¢ ciency of nancial rms
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riskmanagement systems. In fact, it is even di¢ cult for supervisors, that are explicitly in charge of
such monitoring, and assign teams of highly competent examiners to conduct this task.10 To reect
this di¢ culty, we assume, thoughout the paper, that costs (Ci) are unobservable by investors. When
e¤ort is observable, private information on Ci does not a¤ect equilibrium outcomes, because returns,
for a given level of e¤ort, are una¤ected by C. In contrast, when e¤ort is not observable, asymmetric
information on Ci a¤ects equilibrium outcomes, as analysed below, in Section 4.
The unfolding of uncertainty in each period t is illustrated in Figure 1. As can be seen in the gure,
when the manager exerts high e¤ort, the project can fail only with probability t. Thus, expected
surplus (gross of the managerial cost of e¤ort and the outside opportunity wage) is
t = [1  t]Y   (1 + r): (3)
The larger the probability t that there is a negative shock, the lower the expected surplus t. We
assume however (to limit the number of cases), that, even when the innovation is known for sure to
be fragile, t  0, that is
1  p  1

Y   (1 + r)
Y
: (4)
When the manager exerts low e¤ort, on the other hand, the gross expected surplus is
t   tY: (5)
10For example, one can read in the OCCs Handbook on Large Bank Supervision (2010, pages 2 and 3): ...the
OCC assigns examiners to work full-time at the largest institutions... The OCCs large bank supervision objectives are
designed to... [e]valuate the overall integrity and e¤ectiveness of risk management systems, using periodic validation
through transaction testing... examiners ... attempt to ... determine whether ... bank systems and processes permit
management to adequately identify, measure, monitor, and control existing and prospective levels of risk.
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The larger the probability of a shock, the higher the value of riskprevention. Thus, t   tY , the
expected surplus under low e¤ort, is decreasing in t.
Throughout the paper we assume output realizations are observable and contractible. Within each
period t, the sequence of actions is the following:
 Investors and managers start with the same belief t that the innovation is strong.
 Investors and managers meet in the labour market.
 Managers who have been hired exert high or low e¤ort.
 There is a negative shock or not, and this is observable by all market participants.
 For each project, the investment is successful and yields Y or fails and yields 0.
3 The dynamics of innovative activities when e¤ort is observable
In this section we consider the case where e¤orts (ei) are observable and contractible, so that there
are no incentive problems.
3.1 Equilibrium
Investors and managers meet in the labour market. There are two submarkets, one for managers
exerting high e¤ort, the other for managers exerting low e¤ort. We denote by m the compensation
contract for managers hired to exert high e¤ort, and by m the contract for low e¤ort. For simplicity
we assume market participants are competitive. Thus, they take the equilibrium contracts as given.
The equilibrium condition is that labour supply equals labour demand. Labour supply in a given
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submarket is the mass of managers who (weakly) prefer to be hired in that submarket rather than
not being hired or operating in the other submarket. Labour demand is the mass of investors who
(weakly) prefer to invest in this market rather than self-investing or operating in the other market.
Market clearing implies
E[ mje; t] = t; E[mje; t] = max[t   tY; 0]: (6)
When t tY  0, (6) means that investors are indi¤erent between selfinvestment, investment with
high e¤ort and investment with low e¤ort. When t   tY < 0, it means investors are indi¤erent
between selfinvestment and investment with high e¤ort. To see why (6) is necessary for market
clearing, consider the case where t   tY < 0. In that case suppose we had E[ mje; t] < t. Then
all investors would prefer to hire managers to exert high e¤ort, i.e., labor demand in the market for
managers exerting high e¤ort would be equal to one. Yet, labour supply could not exceed F (E[ mje; t]),
which is the mass of managers with cost of e¤ort Ci < E[ mje; t]. Since this mass is strictly lower than
one, the market would not clear. Thus, when t   tY < 0, market clearing entails E[ mje; t] = t
as illustrated in Figure 2. Similar arguments apply for the other cases.
(6) implies that, whenever an investor hires a manager, the latter captures all the surplus generated
by their interaction. This is in line with Berk and Green (2004) where the economic rents ow through
to the managers who create them, not to the investors who invest in them. In both papers the result
reects the assumption that, while all investors are equal, managers are heterogeneous. This is a
realistic assumption. What investors bring is cash. One dollar from one investor cant be very
di¤erent from one dollar from another investor. In contrast, what managers bring is their skills. Its
quite natural and plausible that di¤erent managers will have di¤erent skills, and that there is not an
innite supply of highly talented managers. We capture such scarcity and heterogeneity by assuming
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each manager can handle only one project and managers have di¤erent Cs.
Manager i applies for a job requesting high e¤ort if
E[ mje; t]  Ci  max[0; E[mje; t]  eCi]; (7)
while she applies for a job requesting low e¤ort if
E[mje; t]  eCi  max[0; E[ mje; t]  Ci]; (8)
and otherwise chooses to remain in her initial occupation. Hence manager i choosing between high
e¤ort, lowe¤ort and staying out of the innovative sector obtains the following expected gain
max[E[ mje; t]  Ci; E[mje; t]  eCi; 0]: (9)
Substituting (6) into (9), the expected gain obtained by manager i in the innovative sector is
max[t   Ci; t   tY   eCi; 0]: (10)
Since (10) is also equal to the social value created by the employment of manager i in the innovative
sector, we have that market equilibrium is Pareto optimal. It is natural, since the market is competitive
and frictionless, that the rst welfare theorem holds.
Denoting,
t =
tY
1  e ; t =
t   tY
e
;
(6), (7) and and (8) imply that managers choosing high e¤ort are such that,
Ci  min[t; t]: (11)
while managers choosing low e¤ort are such that
t  Ci  t: (12)
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Dene ^ as the probability of a negative shock such that t = t = t. Simple computations yield
^ =
Y   (1 + r)
Y
1
+ 1 e
: (13)
To focus on the interesting case, we assume that ^ is in the support of ,i.e., 1  p < ^ < 1  p.
t increases linearly in t, while t and t decrease linearly. These functions are as illustrated in
Figure 3. Inspecting the gure and using conditions (11) and (12), one sees that, for t > ^, managers
with Ci  t choose to be employed to exert high e¤ort, while managers with Ci > t prefer to stay
out of the innovative sector. For t  ^, managers with Ci  t choose to be employed to exert
high e¤ort, managers with t  Ci  t choose to be employed to exert low e¤ort, and managers
with Ci > t prefer to stay out of the innovative sector. Thus, noting that t declines as long as the
industry is not hit by a negative shock, we can state our rst proposition.
Proposition 1 When t  ^, all agents hired to manage investment exert high e¤ort, and their
expected compensation, E[ mje; t] = t as well as their mass, F (t), grow as long as the industry is
not hit by a shock.
When t < ^, while a mass F (t) of agents exert high e¤ort, a mass F (t) F (t) exert low e¤ort.
The former earn expected compensation, E[ mje; t] = t, while the latter earn E[mje; t] = t tY .
Both expected compensations, and also the mass of managers in the innovative industry, grow as as
long as the industry is not hit by a shock.
When there is a negative shock, compensation and the number of managers working in the innov-
ative industry suddenly drop.
Managers who are more e¢ cient at controlling risks (with low Ci) are more likely to be employed
in jobs requesting high e¤ort. They correspondingly earn larger compensation. Once condence has
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improved so much that t becomes lower than ^, the increase in the fraction of managers exerting low
e¤ort tends to push average compensation down. But, controlling for the type of tasks (i.e., high or
low e¤ort), compensation continues to grow as long as the innovation is successful.
3.2 Inframarginal rents
Inframarginal managersrents are equal to the di¤erence between their expected compensation and
their cost of e¤ort. Thus manager i obtains rent equal to
R(Ci; t) = max[t   Ci; t   tY   eCi; 0]: (14)
By construction, except for the marginal agent, managers employed in the innovative sector earn
strictly positive rents, reecting the above mentioned scarcity of highly talented managers. Thus we
can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The expected compensation of managers employed in the innovative sector exceeds
the sum of their cost of e¤ort and their outside opportunity wage. The corresponding inframarginal
rents (R(Ci; t)) increase, for all managers, as condence in the strength of the innovative sector
increases.
The quasirents in Corollary 1 reect managersheterogeneity, similarly to Berk and Green (2004).
3.3 Implications of the model with observable e¤ort
3.3.1 Growth and compensation in the innovative sector
As long as there is no negative shock, condence in the innovation increases. Proposition 1 implies
that this leads to an increase in the mass of agents hired to manage investments. When t gets lower
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than ^, the innovation is perceived to be so strong that, even with low e¤ort, it can outperform self
investment. At that point, there is an acceleration in the growth of the innovative sector induced by
good news. Thus, noting that condence increases with the time without negative shocks and also
with the cumulated performance of the innovative sector, we can state our rst implication.
Implication 1: The size of the innovative sector is increasing in the time without negative
shock and the cumulative performance of the innovation. After sustained performance, there is an
acceleration in the growth of the innovative sector.
In equilibrium, the growth of the innovative sector is initially slow, then it accelerates (as managers
with high C enter), then it nally slows down, when (almost) all managers have entered). Thus, there
is an Sshape in the growth of the innovative sector, and this without the usual ingredients giving rise
to Sshapes, such as spillovers or learning (see, e.g., Rogers, 1962). Furthermore, since Corollary 1
imply that expected compensation on top of the opportunity wage w0 increases with the condence
in the innovation, we can state the following implication.
Implication 2:
As the condence in the innovative sector and its size grow, the wage di¤erential between the
innovative sector and the other sector also grows.
Our theoretical result that there is a wage di¤erential between the two sectors is in line with the
empirical ndings of Philippon and Reshe¤ (2009) for the innovative nancial sector. For example,
they write, e.g., nance workers earn on average 10% more than observationally equivalent workers
in the [nonnancial] sector.In addition, our theoretical analysis yields the new empirical implication
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that this wedge increases in the cumulative performance of the innovative sector.
3.3.2 Deteriorating standards in the innovative sector
While, when t > ^, all managers exert high e¤ort, after sustained success t gets lower than ^, and an
increasing fraction of managers are hired without being requested to exert high e¤ort. Correspondingly,
when t gets below ^, there is decline in the proportion of managers exerting high riskprevention e¤ort.
More precisely, when t < ^ the average e¤ort level is
F (t) +
F (t)  F (t)
F (t)
e = e+ (1  e)F (t)
F (t)
;
which is increasing in t, since F (t) is increasing in t while F (t) is decreasing. Thus, as condence
increases (and t goes down), there is a decline in the average level of e¤ort requested, coinciding
with a decline in the average e¢ ciency of riskmanagement systems. Interpreting this as a decline in
riskprevention standards, we obtain the following implication.
Implication 3: After sustained success, there is a decline in riskprevention standards, starting
at the time at which the growth of the innovative sector accelerates.
Implication 3 is consistent with the empirical ndings of DellAriccia et al (2008) who, e.g., write
in their abstract: This paper links the current subprime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending
standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market.DellAriccia et al. (2008) relate their
empirical ndings to asymmetric information based theories of nancial accelerators (see Bernanke
and Gertler, 1998, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Yet, our analysis shows that agency problems
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are not needed to rationalize these ndings.11 The decline in standards in Implication 3 corresponds
to the entry of nancial intermediaries with weaker and weaker riskcontrol systems. To test this
implication, empirical proxies for the strength of riskcontrol systems are needed. One could rely on
the Risk Management Index developed by Ellul and Yerramilli (2010).12
3.3.3 Unlikely but large aggregate losses
The probability of a negative shock (t) goes down with the number of periods without shock. For
t  ^, the mass of failing projects in case of a negative shock is
F (t):
This decreases with t, i.e., decreases with the condence in the innovation, simply because, as con-
dence grows, more projects are operated in the innovative sector. When t < ^ the mass of failures in
case of negative shock becomes
F (t)+ [F (t)  F (t)]+ [F (t)  F (t)];
which is also decreasing in t. This reects two evolutions: First, as above, as condence increases,
the number of projects operated in the innovative sector increases. Second, as condence increases,
an increasing fraction of the projects is operated with low riskprevention e¤ort. Thus we can state
the next implication.
Implication 4: As the probability of a shock (t) declines, the size of the loss in case of shocks
11 In the next section, however, we show that these problems are exacerbated by information asymmetry.
12Consistent with our theoretical analysis, Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) nd that nancial institutions with stronger
riskcontrol systems in 2006 had lower exposure to privatelabel mortgagebacked securities, had a smaller fraction of
nonperforming loans and had lower downside risk during the crisis years.
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increases. After a sustained period of success, when t gets lower than ^, there is an acceleration in
the size of the innovative sector and the mass of failures in case of shock.
Our theoretical analysis thus implies that long awaited shocks, that come after a period of sus-
tained performance and growing condence, are more severe than shocks happening during the early
developments of the innovation.13 This is in line with the empirical nding by DellAriccia et al (2012)
that busts following long booms are worse than busts coming after short booms. The pattern gener-
ated by our model could look like a bubble followed by a crash. Yet it simply reects how the optimal
level of investment and e¤ort adjusts as agents learn about the strength of the innovation.
3.3.4 The crosssection of failure probabilities
For t  ^, the failure probability for each project operated in the innovative sector is t. For t < ^
the failure probability in the innovative sector remains equal to t for projects with Ci  t, but it
is t( + ) for projects with Ci > t. Thus, for t < ^, the crosssectional average default rate in
the innovative sector is
tfF (t)
F (t)
+
F (t)  F (t)
F (t)
(+ )g = tf+ (1  F (t)
F (t)
)g:
This is the product of the probability of shock (t) by the crosssectional average probability of default
in case of shock. The latter increases with the condence in the innovative sector.
While for t  ^, all managers operating in the innovative sector have the same probability of
default: t, for t < ^, a fraction F (t)=F (t) of the managers have default rate in case of shock
13Our analysis of the implications of Proposition 1 for the dynamics of risk is complemented, in Appendix 2, by an
analysis of the implications of our model for the dynamics of two popular measures: Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall.
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equal to , while for the others it is + . Hence, for t  ^, the crosssectional variance of default
probabilities in case of shock is 0, while, for lower values of t, it is
2
F (t)
F (t)
(1  F (t)
F (t)
)2:
As t crosses ^,
F (t)
F (t)
is initially close to one. Then it decreases with further increases in condence.
Correspondingly, the crosssectional variance of default probabilities in case of shock is initially very
small, but increases as condence builds up. On the other hand, if t decreases enough for
F (t)
F (t)
to
reach 1=2, then further increases in condence reduce this crosssectional variance. The intuition is
the following. As long as t > ^, all managers exert high e¤ort, so that there is no crosssectional
variation in the probability of default in case of shock. When t crosses ^ from above, an initially small
but gradually increasing fraction of managers exerts low e¤ort. Correspondingly, for values of t below
^, but not too far from it, heterogeneity in e¤ort exertion across managers increases with condence.
But, for very low values of t, the majority of managers exert low e¤ort, and further decreases in t
increase this majority, thereby reducing the heterogeneity in default probabilities. Correspondingly,
the crosssectional variance of default probabilities across managers is inverseU shaped in t. Our
next implication summarizes this discussion:
Implication 5: As condence in the innovation improves, the average default rate in case of shock
increases, while the crosssectional variance of default rates rst increases and then decreases.
To test Implication 5, one needs empirical proxies for failure probabilities. One could rely on put
options with di¤erent strikes, on credit risk implied by interest rates, or on CDS prices, for the market
as well as for individual names.
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3.3.5 Search for yield and the dynamics of the innovative sector
When r is low, the return on selfinvestment is low, which leads investors to search for yield. Other
things equal, a decrease in r raises t and ^. This accelerates the entry of managers exerting low
e¤ort, and the growth of the innovative industry, but also increases the size of total losses in case of
negative shock. This is stated in our next implication.
Implication 6: When r is low, and investors search for yield, the growth of the innovative sector
is stronger, but the size of total losses in case of shock is larger.
4 The dynamics of innovative activities under moral hazard
The equilibrium analyzed above corresponds to the perfect market case. In practice, however, inno-
vative industries are likely to be plagued with information asymmetries. To shed light on the conse-
quences of these problems, we now turn to the case where e¤orts (ei) are unobservable by investors.14
We hereafter refer to this situation as moral hazard.
While in the rstbest it was su¢ cient to consider the expected compensation of managers, under
moral hazard, the precise mapping from observable ouctomes to transfers must now be specied.
Because of limited liability, when the realization of ~Y is 0 the compensation of the manager is also 0.
Hence, we need only consider four transfers: m( = 0) paid to the agent requested high e¤ort when he
is succesful and there is no shock, m( = 1) when the agent requested high e¤ort is successful in spite
14Our modelling of the unobservability of e¤ort is similar to that in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In our model,
however, unlike in Holmstrom and Tirole, i) the consequences of the level of e¤ort depend on whether there is an
aggregate shock or not, and ii) the cost of e¤ort is not observable by investors.
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of a shock, and m( = 0) and m( = 1) for the corresponding outcomes when the agent is requested
low e¤ort.
4.1 Equilibrium
When condence in the innovation is strong enough, the expected surplus is so large that the rstbest
allocation is incentive compatible, in spite of the unobservability of e¤ort. To show this, we exhibit
a contract, m (o¤ered to managers exerting highe¤ort as well as to those exerting low e¤ort) that
implements the rst best allocation and is incentive compatible when t is large enough. This contract
is such that m( = 1) = Y . Since managers receive all the output in case of shock (which is the only
case where e¤ort matters), it is in their own interest to choose the rstbest level of e¤ort. Consider
for example the incentive compatibility condition for highe¤ort:
E[mje; t]  Ci  E[mje; t]  eCi; (15)
that is
C  m( = 1)
1  e : (16)
With m( = 1) = Y , (16) simplies to
tY
1  e  Ci;
which is the condition under which, in the rst best, a manager entering the innovative sector prefers
to exert high e¤ort rather than low e¤ort. Furthermore, given that m( = 1) = Y , investors break
even if and only if
(1  t)[Y  m( = 0)] = 1 + r:
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This is compatible with the limitedliability constraint that m( = 0)  0 if and only if
t  Y   (1 + r)
Y
:
Finally, since investors just break even and managers exert the e¢ cient level of e¤ort, managers obtain
the entire surplus when they enter the innovative sector. Consequently, it is in their own interest to
make the entry decisions that are rstbest optimal. Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When t  Y (1+r)Y , equilibrium is the same with or without moral hazard.
Hereafter, we restrict attention to the more interesting case where moral hazard matters, i.e, we
focus on values of t above
Y (1+r)
Y . An important feature of equilibrium dynamics in the rstbest
is the switch from the equilibrium regime where all managers exert e¤ort (arising for t  ^), to that
in which some exert low e¤ort. Since the choice of e¤ort level is the key decision in our moral hazard
model, it is important to consider the values of t for which the switch from high to low e¤ort can
occur. Since we focus on t >
Y (1+r)
Y , this requires that ^ >
Y (1+r)
Y . This inequality is equivalent
to
1  e > 
1  ; (17)
which we assume hereafter. The interpretation of (17) is the following: The lefthandside is the
additional amount of e¤ort needed to exert high riskprevention. The righthandside is the relative
increase in risk avoided by exerting high e¤ort. Condition (17) states that the cost of switching to
high e¤ort (proportional to lefthandside) is relatively large compared to the benet (proportional
to the righthandside). In that case, the switch from high to low e¤ort occurs relatively early. That
is, ^ is relatively small, smaller than Y (1+r)Y .
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We now establish, that when t >
Y (1+r)
Y , under moral hazard, two distinct contracts cannot be
o¤ered in equilibrium. Suppose by contradiction that two distinct contracts are o¤ered. Since investors
must exactly break even on each contract, the expected pay-o¤s, and the decisions of managers (high
e¤ort, low e¤ort, no participation) must be exactly the same as in Proposition 1. Now, Proposition
1 implies that there are two active contracts only when t < ^, and that contract m (compensating
high e¤ort) is chosen by all managers such that
Ci  t =
tY
1  e : (18)
Similarly to (16), the incentive compatibility condition is
Ci   m( = 1)
1  e (19)
for all the managers i choosing contract m. For the marginal manager (18) holds as an equality and
(19) can hold only if m( = 1) = Y . As shown above, in the proof of Proposition 2, m( = 1) = Y
is compatible with limited liability only when t  Y (1+r)Y , which is ruled out by construction. This
shows, by contradiction, that there is always at most one active contract at equilibrium. Hence, we
can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Under moral hazard, when (17) holds and t >
Y (1+r)
Y , at most one contract is
o¤ered at equilibrium.
Our third, striking, result is that, contrarily to the case where e¤ort is observable, moral hazard
implies that there is always a positive fraction of active managers that exert low e¤ort at equilibrium.
Again, the proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose all active managers would exert high e¤ort. Then
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equilibrium would involves a unique contract, m. m would be such that investors would break even:
(1  t)m( = 0) + t(1  )m( = 1) = (1  t))Y   (1 + r)  ;
and all managers with Ci  t choose it. Incentive compatibility would require that managers prefer
to exert high e¤ort, which is equivalent to (16). This holds for all active managers if and only if
tm( = 1)  (1  e):
This is compatible with the investorsbreak even condition only if
(1  t)m( = 0)  [1  (1  )(1  e)

]:
The righthandside is negative by assumption (17). The inequality, therefore, is not consistent with
limited liability. Hence a contradiction. We can thus state the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Under moral hazard, when (17) holds and t >
Y (1+r)
Y ; there is always a positive
fraction of active managers that exert low e¤ort at equilibrium.
We now characterize the equilibrium arising in that case. We know that it must be a pooling
equilibrium, in which only one contract, m, is o¤ered and some of the managers accepting it exert
high e¤ort while others exert low e¤ort. Denoting
C =
tm( = 1)
1  e ; (20)
and
C =
(1  t)m( = 0) + t(1   )m( = 1)
e
; (21)
the managers who prefer high e¤ort than low e¤ort are those with Ci  C, while those who prefer to
be hired and exert low e¤ort are such that C  Ci  C.
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The market clearing condition, requiring that investors earn zeroprot, is
(1  t)m( = 0) + t(1   x)m( = 1) = (1  t(+ x))Y   (1 + r);
where x is the fraction of the managers hired in the innovative sector who exert low e¤ort, i.e.,
x = 1  F (C)
F ( C)
= 1 
F ( tm(=1)1 e )
F ( (1 t)m(=0)+t(1  )m(=1)e )
:
A contract such that m( = 0) > 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed an investor could undercut
this contract by o¤ering another one with a lower m( = 0) and a larger m( = 1), in such a way that
the expected gain for a manager exerting low e¤ort would be the same (leaving C unchanged) while
increasing the gain from high e¤ort (thus raising C). This would attract exactly the same managers,
but a higher fraction of them would make an e¤ort, thus generating positive expected gains for the
investors. Hence, in equilibrium, we must have m( = 0) = 0. Thus, x rewrites as
x = 1 
F ( tm(=1)1 e )
F ( t(1  )m(=1)e )
:
For simplicity, we assume costs are uniformly distributed over [0; Cmax].15 Then the fraction of
managers exerting low e¤ort simplies to
x = 1  e
1  e

1    : (22)
The condition under which investorsexpected prots are nonnegative is
(1  t(+ x))Y   (1 + r)  0; (23)
15The result that x is a constant obtains whenever f(m), which can be interpreted as labor supply, has constant
elasticity. More generally, if elasticity is nondecreasing, the equilibrium is unique and exhibits the additional property
that x increases with the condence in the innovation.
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which simplies to
t  1
+ x
Y   (1 + r)
Y
:
If that condition does not hold, there is a market breakdown and no manager is hired in the innovative
sector. The above analysis leads to our next proposition, illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 5: Under moral hazard, when (17) hold and costs are uniformly distributed over
[0; Cmax], equilibrium is as follows.
i) When
t >
1
+ x
Y   (1 + r)
Y
; (24)
no manager is hired in the innovative sector.
ii) When
1
+ x
Y   (1 + r)
Y
 t > Y   (1 + r)
Y
;
there exists a pooling equilibrium, in which only one contract m is o¤ered, a fraction x of the managers
working in the innovative sector exerts low e¤ort, and the complementary fraction exerts high e¤ort.
The average expected compensation of managers is given by (23), which increases as condence in the
innovative sector improves.
The intuition underlying the proposition is the following:
i) When the risk of a negative shock is so high that (24) holds, incentive problems generate an
innovation trap.If e¤ort was observable, it would be feasible to request high e¤ort from all managers.
This would enable investment to take place, which would, in turn, generate learning about the strength
of the innovation. Because of moral hazard however, it is impossible to ensure that all managers exert
highe¤ort, therefore investment in the innovative sector is not protable. So the innovation cannot
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develop, and learning cannot take place.
ii) When t is intermediate, while in the rst best managers exerting low e¤ort and managers
exerting high e¤ort would choose di¤erent contracts, under asymmetric information such sorting is
not incentive compatible. Hence there is pooling.
4.2 Implications of binding incentive problems
The next implication summarizes how moral hazard a¤ects the development of innovations. In line
with the above analysis, we focus on the case where t is large and (17) holds. Part i) of Proposition
5 yields the next implication:
Implication 7: Under moral hazard, when initial condence is very low, as 0 > 1+x
Y (1+r)
Y ,
and (17) holds, then moral hazard precludes the development of innovations that would have occurred
in the rst best. In this context, a decline in the rate of return on standard investments (r) can trigger
a wave of innovations.
When r declines, the threshold level above which innovations are trapped goes up. Hence, inno-
vations that had become available but had not been able to develop can suddenly get implemented.
Thus, there is a wave of innovations.
While the possibility of market breakdown under moral hazard underlined in Implication 7 is not
surprising, the next implication (which stems from part ii) of Proposition 4 and its illustration in
Figure 4) is more unexpected.
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Implication 8: Under moral hazard, when (17) holds, if the innovation is not trapped, the
growth rate of the innovative sector for t >
Y (1+r)
Y is strictly larger than in the rst best. Fur-
thermore, there exists a threshold  2 [Y (1+r)Y ; 1+x Y (1+r)Y ), such that, for t 2 [Y (1+r)Y ; ), the
size of the innovative sector is larger than in the rst best.
When e¤ort is unobservable but condence is not too low, the rate of growth of the innovative
sector is larger than in the rst best. This reects that many managers enter and exert low e¤ort,
which contrasts with the rst best where e¢ cient managers, exerting high e¤ort, would enter. Thus
moral hazard spurs the entry of ine¢ cient managers exerting low e¤ort, which fuels the growth of the
innovative sector.
This can lead to a situation where, under moral hazard, the size of the innovative sector is larger
than in the rst best. To see how this obtains, consider Figure 4. Managers that are hired and exert low
e¤ort are those with Ci in [C; C]. C intersects the horizontal axis at t = 1+x
Y (1+r)
Y , which is larger
than the point at which t intersects the horizontal axis, t =
1
+
Y (1+r)
Y , but lower than the point
at which t intersects the horizontal axis. On the other hand, C intersects t for t =
Y (1+r)
Y , a point
at which t > t. Hence, there exists a threshold 
, such that C > max[t; t] for t 2 [Y (1+r)Y ; ).
Now, in this region, the size of the innovative sector in the rst best is F (max[t; t]), while in the
second best it is F ( C). Hence, for these values of t, the size of the innovative sector is larger under
moral hazard than in the rst best.
The intuitive economic reason why moral hazard inates the innovative sector is that, as mentioned
above, it spurs the entry of managers exerting low e¤ort. This fuels the growth of the sector. On
the other hand, it lowers the average expected surplus generated by investments in the innovative
sector. One could think this decline in expected surplus would deter investment by principals. This
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is not the case because, in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4, there is crosssubsidization of
managers exerting low e¤ort by managers exerting high e¤ort. The former receive higher expected
compensation than the (negative) surplus they generate for society, while the latter receive lower
expected compensation than the (positive) surplus they generate for society. Hence, the expected
losses incurred by investors hiring managers who turn out to exert low e¤ort are o¤set by their expected
gains when hiring managers who turn out exerting high e¤ort. Thus, in a sense, the excessively inated
growth of the innovative sector is funded by the subsidies of the managers exerting high e¤ort. And
these subsidies result in agency rents for managers exerting low e¤ort, as stated in the next implication.
Implication 9: Under moral hazard, when (17) holds, for t 2 [Y (1+r)Y ; ), agents exerting low
e¤ort earn agency rents.
Taken together, Implications 8 and 9 contrast with previous theoretical results. To the extent
that rents are transfers from principals to agents, they tend to deter investment by managers. In this
context, moral hazard reduces the size of the sector relative to the rst best, as, e.g., in Axelon and
Bond (2011). This is not the case in the present model, where, in contrast with Axelson and Bond
(2011), not only e¤ort but also the cost of e¤ort are unobservable. In this context, the rents earned
by ine¢ cient agents are funded by the e¢ cient agents, rather than the principals.
While the inated growth of the innovative sector is privately optimal for the managers exerting
low e¤ort, who would not have been hired in the rst best, it is socially costly, as it drives utilitarian
welfare below its rstbest level. This social cost materializes when a negative shock hits and large
losses are incurred, as stated in the next implication.
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Implication 10: Under moral hazard, when (17) holds, for  2 [Y (1+r)Y ; ), default probabil-
ities and aggregate losses in case of shock are higher than in the rst best.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis of the dynamics of innovations and risk under learning yields two key insights: First, the
strongest growth episodes of the innovative sector are fueled by the entry of managers exerting low
risk prevention e¤ort and therefore correspond to a decline in risk prevention standards. Second,
under moral hzard, there is excessive entry of managers exerting low e¤ort and earning informational
rents, so that the innovative sector is larger and riskier than in the rst best.
Thus, in our model, the signature of moral hazard is strong growth at early stages of the develop-
ment of the innovation. In the rst best, early growth is slow, because limited condence implies only
managers exerting high e¤ort should enter. Under asymmetric information, early growth is strong, in
spite of limited condence, due to the entry of managers exerting low prevention e¤orts, that cant be
screened from those exerting high prevention e¤ort.
While the present model features only managers and investors, it would be interesting to extend the
analysis by introducing a supervisor or regulator, better able than investors to monitor the managers
riskmanagement systems. Since under asymmetric information there is excess entry of managers
with ine¢ cient riskmanagement systems, supervisory monitoring could improve welfare by imposing
compliance to riskmanagement standards. When should that occur? Our theoretical analysis suggests
that strong growth should not be taken as an encouraging sign that the innovation is healthy, calling
for lighttouch regulation.Quite to the contrary, it is in periods of strong growth that resources
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should be spent to monitor the innovative sector, check riskprevention standards, and bar entry for
institutions with weak riskmanagement systems.
Also, while our results obtain with rational agents, they could be amplied by psychological biases,
such as, e.g., overcondence. After a few years without negative shocks, overcondent market par-
ticipants would become excessively condent that the innovation is strong.16 This would magnify the
e¤ects we analyze, reduce riskprevention further, and make the innovative sector more vulnerable.
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Figure 1: The structure of uncertainty in period t
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Figure 3: Equilibrium dynamics without incentive problems
β
α is the expected surplus generated with high effort (gross of the cost of effort)
β is the threshold value of C below which high effort is preferred to low effort
γ is the threshold value of C below which delegated investment with low effort is
more valuable than self investment. When Ci < min[α,β] there is high effort. 
When β < Ci < γ there is low effort. 
^
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Figure 4: Equilibrium under moral hazard when Δ/(1-μ) < 1 – e
α, β and γ are as in Figure 3. For θ > (Y –(1+r)/Y,  when Ci < C there is high effort. 
When C < Ci < C there is low effort. For θ > (Y –(1+r)/Y, when Ci < β there is
high effort, when β < Ci < γ there is low effort. 
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